

# The subjective in authenticity: A performer's perspective

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In first considering what I would speak about at a symposium entitled “Das Alte im Neuen”, the topic of objectivity immediately sprang to mind. After all, the rise of objectivity as a performance ideal in the course of the twentieth century, and the consequent interpretation during the 1960s of historical sources through the lens of a by-then ubiquitous objectivity, is the subject of a course that I have been teaching at the Conservatory of Amsterdam for more than ten years now. It would have been easy for me to re-work a lecture from this course into something for the symposium: to have pulled my CDs of Arnold Dolmetsch and Wanda Landowska out of the cupboard, to have made Richard Taruskin do a little dance before your eyes, and to have frightened you with that Big Bad Wolf, Igor Stravinsky. However, the more I considered this plan, the less attractive it seemed. Demonstrating the historical inaccuracy of applying an idealized objectivity to Baroque music is something that I have grown weary of doing.

What is of far greater interest to me than modernist objectivity is good old-fashioned *subjectivity*, the experience in the body and soul of the player during performance.<sup>1</sup> But this topic is taboo. Though many Early Music practitioners in this post-Taruskin world would hotly deny that they aspire to objectivity in their performances, few would embrace subjectivity whole-heartedly as a viable approach to music of the past. That would be ... well, naive, and Heaven help anyone who might embrace such a simplistic approach to the performance of Early Music, as one based on personal feeling!

Moreover, the impossibility of giving external, verifiable context to a purely inner experience makes it difficult for any protagonist of subjectivity to meet current standards of scholarship. One can take distance in discussing the rise of objectivity in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. One can cite articles and consult scores, one can theorize using terms like ‘modernism’, or *Neue Sachlichkeit*; in short, one can be scholarly. Objectivity can be discussed objectively and therefore is worthy of academic inquiry. But how can one be objective about the inner feeling of performance?<sup>2</sup>

What follows then is not meant to conform to rigorous academic standards. Rather, it is an essay that takes as its starting point my *own* reflections, viewed by the refracted light of 18<sup>th</sup>-century sources, on the subject of the emotions of the performer during performance. I have consulted treatises from Germany, Eng-

land and France written in the first half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century – not only texts about music, but I also have included an acting treatise. My choices are, of course, subjective, but these are the texts I kept coming back to in my musings on the topic of the inner experience of the performer. In order to understand why I have chosen these sources above all others, and indeed, in order to follow my arguments, two fundamental premises of this essay must be disclosed.

The first premise is that, in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, music and rhetoric were seen as closely related: music was believed to be a kind of language, a composition was heard as an oration and the composer, like an orator, aimed to move and edify the listeners *through performance*. The second premise is that the affects or passions, as conceived of in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, were not so very different from what we call emotions today. When historical sources speak of tears, of sobs, of trembling as being the perceptible signs of the passions in the human frame, I understand that they are speaking of emotions so strong as to manifest themselves in the body *physically*.

And indeed, it is with emotion that I begin, turning to Johann Mattheson (1681–1764), who dedicated a chapter of his *Der vollkommene Capellmeister* (Part I, Chapter 3) to a discussion of how music moves the affections. One could and really should explore this material in depth, in all of its complexity, but for my present purposes suffice it to say that Mattheson draws a correlation between what we today might call musical ‘gestures’, and the sensations one feels in the body during the experience of specific emotions. Thus, the sensation of the expansion of the body that is concomitant with the emotion *courage* can be mimicked musically by means of expansive intervals. In turn, the musical imitation of the inner feeling can trigger a similar somatic experience in the listener. This correspondence between musical sounds and the ‘feeling of what happens’ in the listener’s body will, according to Mattheson, move the listener to the very same affect that the music is mimicking, *by means of the performance*. If music was a drug to heal the emotions, it was prescribed by the composer and administered by the performer, who, let us not forget, were often one and the same person.

The 18<sup>th</sup>-century composer had at his disposal a number of commonplaces or figures – call them musical gestures if you will – which were based on this principle of *mimesis* or mimicry. He could use these musical figures to fire his own creative musical imagination in the act of composition, in order to better move the audience during acts of performance. To give another example, in opposition to large intervals, which Mattheson believed could provoke courage or joy in the body of the listener, were the small ones that triggered melancholy or sadness. Such commonplaces, however, were not always fully effective on their own. According to Mattheson, some affects could not be properly expressed by the commonplaces, unless the latter were further augmented by material drawn from the composer’s own subjective, personal experiences. One such affect was love, of which he wrote:

“A composer of amorous compositions must certainly here consult his own experience, be it past or present; for in himself, and in his own affect, shall he find the best model, according to which he can arrange his expressions in sounds. If however he has no personal experience of, or no truly lively feeling [of], so noble a passion, then he should not bother with it; for he is more likely to succeed in all else before this oh so sensitive inclination [affect]. [...] Next to love, one who wishes skillfully to represent sadness in sounds [der die Traurigkeit im Klange wol vorstellen will] must, much more than the other passions, feel and experience it; otherwise all the so-called *loci topici* [...] will go down the drain. The reason is that being sad and being in love are two closely related things. *Qui dit amoureux, dit triste*.”<sup>3</sup>

And then Mattheson goes on to say: “It is true that most of the other passions, when they are to be represented naturally, must be strongly felt by the composer to a great degree [...]”<sup>4</sup> Indeed, having devoted such a significant portion of his chapter to the affections, he closes by saying that he will not try to go further describing the individual passions because considering

“that the affects particularly have just the [same] condition as that of a bottomless sea, so that, however much trouble one might take to draw up something comprehensive about them, only the minimum would be completed, endless amounts, however, would be left unsaid, and should be left to each individual’s own natural receptivity [Empfindung].”<sup>5</sup>

Oh, worthy listener! Are these not words to make an early musician tremble? Have we not sworn faithfully to serve the ‘composer’s intentions’? To forgo personal whims, to renounce the egotistical act of making a piece our own, in favour of reproducing what the composer himself wanted to hear? Yet, how can I know what Mattheson expected to hear, if he based his expression not on some 18<sup>th</sup>-century pattern, some stock gesture, some abstraction of feeling, but rather his own personal experience of love and sadness ... the deep and often terrible experiences of the human heart? What know I of Mattheson’s personal *amours* and sorrows? I only know my own, and to express myself, my own feelings, and my own personal experiences, is forbidden me!

It is forbidden me – not by any historical treatise that I am aware of – but rather by the ideologies of the late 20<sup>th</sup>-century Early Music movement, particularly as it developed in the Low Countries after World War II, in the wake of Gustav Leonhardt’s (1928–2012) successes. The roots of this distrust of personal feeling can, in fact, be traced back to well before the Great War. My ongoing study of inter-bellum criticism levelled at the hyper-Romantic conductor Willem Mengelberg’s (1871–1951) *St Matthew Passion* performances makes clear that Dutch critics like Herman Rutters (1879–1961), an influential music pedagogue and critic who wrote for the *Algemeen Handelsblad*, objected strongly to the injection of personal feelings into any sacred music, since this would bring it too close to the performance of opera.<sup>6</sup> The expression of the personal was pejoratively labelled by Rutters *virtuosity*, and such virtuosity was strongly condemned as egotistical, self-serving and crowd-pleasing. The close temporal and ideological proximities of Rutter’s religious (Protestant) ideals to those of the contempo-

aneous *Singbewegung*, which sought to connect modern man with a timeless universal spirituality through a collective, objective performance of music, led Rutters to view *all* great music as sacred, and thus the personal was to be forever banned from the concert stage: sacred music – and remember that all great music was considered spiritual and therefore ‘sacred’ – needed no mediator. Indeed, to interpret, to mediate, would be to pervert the intended message by tainting it with *ego*.<sup>7</sup>

Rutters’ music criticism, which appeared in one of the Netherlands’ most prominent newspapers from 1916 until just after World War II, helped to create a climate in which the objective authenticity associated with the Dutch School could flourish. One method to achieve objectivity was for the performer to abandon any attempt to please the audience. In 1980, in the speech that he gave upon receiving the Erasmus Prize for the famous Bach cantata recording project, Leonhardt wrote:

“The musician who moves has contact with ‘the music’; if he should seek contact with the audience then he is vain and uses the composition, instead of serving it and giving it and himself to the audience, using himself. [...] Therefore, the artist (creative or performing) can never, in my opinion, have contact with his fellow man. He chooses an *object* rather than a subject for the sublimation of his humanity ...”<sup>8</sup>

A veil of self-effacing spirituality is artfully draped over this passage. Why, one might ask, should any musician want to *sublimate his humanity*, unless it is to leave the music untainted by any human contact? Moreover, Leonhardt seems almost to suggest that one cannot be in contact with the music and the audience at the same time ... but why should this be? Cannot the performer, like the orator, combine all the elements of that Aristotelian triumvirate *logos, pathos, ethos*? But it is the moral implication of Leonhardt’s language, whether intended by him or not, that I find most disturbing; for if the performer who seeks *to move his audience directly* is vain, then surely it is only logical to conclude that the performer who offers the music to the audience *while entirely ignoring them*, must be humble.

What historical justifications are there for creating such distance from the audience? Were the aims of rhetoric not defined, in the time of Cicero as in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, as *docere, delectare, et movere*: to teach, to delight and to move the listener? And which, oh, which rhetorical treatise bids us to teach, delight and move the audience by ignoring them?

As recently as 2014, another highly influential representative of the Dutch school, Sigiswald Kuijken (b. 1944), expressed disdain for vain performers in an interview:

“If you are a musician, you are not the one who should be displaying his ego ... with the help of what? The beautiful pieces all those composers wrote in the past. You can do that if you really want to, but then I think that you are vain. [You] can be very talented, but that is a stance that I don’t like. For instance, for me, you [mustn’t] just use Bach and Mozart to let your own talent shine. Better to play Kreisler and the things that are made more to that purpose; then that is nice. But with very fan-

tastic, deep and sometimes very simple geniuses, as Mozart or Bach sometimes can be, these you must treat, I believe, with timidity; you see, you are in their service, which doesn't mean that you shouldn't be creative, but you especially must figure out [...] what they want to say with what they wrote there. And to that you must not add one iota, and not start messing around with it too much because [you've decided] you're just going to make it interesting [...]; or 'to interpret' it, I mean for a number of years now already I have been so disagreeable as to say that I *have had it* with the word interpretation, I would much rather speak of realization. We need to realize the scores; and that is not objective [...]. It is actually *we* who are doing that, [therefore] the danger that you do it too objectively hardly exists.”<sup>9</sup>

Kuijken here seems to suggest that a sufficient quotient of subjective content is ensured in performance by the mere fact that ‘we’ living human beings are ‘realizing’ the notes on the page. Without ‘messing around’ with them, ‘interpreting’ them or adding ‘one iota’ of the personal to them, they will be subjective enough.

How well I remember one of my early lessons with Sigiswald's brother, Barthold Kuijken (b. 1949), at the Royal Conservatory in the Hague in 1982! One remark made during that lesson in particular has remained with me. It was prompted by my use of rubato in an 18<sup>th</sup>-century French piece that I was playing. Bart stopped me and informed me, kindly but firmly with that characteristic twinkle in his eye, that I made “a very nice sauce” which I then “poured” indiscriminately over everything that I played. I can see why, from his point of view, he would find such a remark necessary to make; but for me, the changes of tempo to which he objected reflected my inner experience of changing emotion while I performed the piece. What he was saying to me, from my point of view, was actually that my personal feelings were like a sauce that I poured over every piece I played, making them all sound ... like me.<sup>10</sup>

Oh, I can see that this seems a noble ideal, to banish *me*, to banish virtuosity, to banish the ego, from the act of music-making (and whether the devotees of this style would admit it or not, by idealizing the *objective*, an attempt is made to banish the ‘me’ from performance). But how unsatisfying an ideal it is for a musician like myself, who was drawn to performance because it allowed me to express myself, to express my feelings, including my great love and admiration for the music, and to give my own heart a voice that could be heard by like-minded lovers of music!<sup>11</sup> What most shocked me – having come to the Netherlands from a different country with a different musical culture, where I had been trained to approach pre-20<sup>th</sup>-century repertoire from an imaginative-poetic disposition – about the cult of objectivity was this underlying notion that my wish to communicate with the audience was insincere, egotistical, vain. I could see that I might be deluded in my interpretation, that I might entirely overshoot the mark in my performances, but to say that I was *insincere* was to miss the point entirely. After all, it was the absolute experience of sincerity in performance, the feeling that my heart, my soul, spoke directly to people through the music, in a way which I could not achieve with words, that made me want to become a musician in the first place. The sincere pleasure of sharing what I loved most in the world – music! – with others was my motivation. What was I to do?

“But”, I hear my critics cry, “the solution is easy! The performer must simply play without *over*-interpreting, without expressing *too much* emotion ... just a bit of feeling, just a whiff of the personal here or there: an articulation slightly bigger or smaller *here*, an accent slightly more or less audible *there* ... and even if Mattheson reveals to us that the composer awakened his feelings while composing, surely the performer should *just play the notes*. The composer has done the work already, the performer needs nothing personal, needs not embody the thoughts of the composer, nor amplify them by making them his own.” And yet ... and yet ... here is what Mattheson says about French opera singers:

“Observe the French singers, male and female, how much fervour they expend on their [roles], and [how] nearly all of them appear really to feel that which they are singing about. That is also why they strongly awaken the passions of the listeners, especially of their [own] countrymen, and, by means of their gestures and manner, compensate for that which they lack in basic training, stability and voice.”<sup>12</sup>

Here it is the ability of the French singers, not to ‘realize the score’ or even to sing well, but to convince the audience of the authenticity of their feelings as they sing, through their *acting*, that enables them strongly to move the listeners. How did they do this, if not by drawing on their own emotions, their own feelings? Mattheson praises them for the result, and indeed, the acting treatises of the period affirm the idea of an authentic personal feeling infusing the text during performance. Let us turn to an English acting source, Charles Gildon’s (1665–1724) *The life of Mr. Thomas Betterton*, published in London in 1710. In it, Gildon recounts the well-known and oft-cited story of an ancient Greek actor named Polus, who drew on his own personal sorrows in performing the role of Electra. As Simon Goldhill informs us:

“One of the most famous stories about ancient acting concerns the actor Polus. He was already a celebrity performer when he was cast to play Sophocles’ *Electra*. Perhaps the most moving scene in the play is when Electra takes from the disguised Orestes the urn supposed to contain her dead brother’s ashes. In Sophocles’ play, Electra laments over the urn with unbearable feeling. [...] Polus shockingly filled the urn with the ashes of his recently dead son before he played Electra. The performance went down in Greek history as one of the most moving ever for actor and audience alike.”<sup>13</sup>

Thus, the story goes, the very real, very personal grief of the actor was used to awaken his own emotions in performance, and consequently those of his listeners. It was the *sincerity of his sorrow* that struck a chord with the audience. Let us now turn to Gildon, who describes it thus:

“[Polus] went to the Grave of his own beloved Child, and brings his Urn on, instead of the suppos’d Urn of *Orestes*; which so mov’d him, and melted his Heart into such Compassion and Tenderness, at the Sight of that real Object of Sorrow, that he broke out into such loud Exclamations, and such unfeigned Tears, as fill’d the whole House with Grief, Weeping, and Lamentations.”<sup>14</sup>

Gildon, in describing a scene from Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, then goes on to *condone* actors for using personal emotions, noting that the Bard himself suggested that the actor's soul be

"forc'd so to his whole Conceit, *etc.* The first place is the fixing this [the actor's 'Conceit'] in the *Soul*, to engage that thoroughly [sic] in the Passion, and then from her Working will his Visage warm, his Eyes flow with Tears, and Distractions spread over all his Face; nay, then will his Voice be broken, and every Faculty of his Body be agreeable to this strong Emotion of the Soul. [...] he derives a yet stronger Action when the Object of Grief is real; which justifies what the Ancients practis'd in heightning their Theatrical Sorrow, by fixing the Mind on real Objects; or by working your self up by a strong Imagination, that you are the very Person and in the very same Circumstances, which will make the Case so very much your own, that you will not want Fire in Anger, nor Tears in Grief: And then you need not fear affecting the Audience, for Passions are wonderfully convey'd from one Person's Eyes to another's; the Tears of *one* melting the Heart of the *other*, by a very visible Sympathy between their Imaginations and Aspects."<sup>15</sup>

The objection may be raised that this is only applicable to actors operatic and theatrical. Yet, here is what Mattheson says in the chapter in which he praises French singers for their convincing performances, his chapter on gesture:

"Meanwhile, we will here only take account of as much [about gesture] as serves our described purpose: for he who does not want to become a professional speaker, actor, [or] dancer should not regard such information as a main subject of activity. And yet, no one will be able to deny, upon ripe reflection, that a large part of music, which is a speech in tones, is contained in it, and that, whoever would be called a true master of music, if not more, must at least have a clear understanding of it; no matter whether he wishes to be seen as an amateur with a good judgement or as an artist who sings, plays or composes well."<sup>16</sup>

Thus composers, singers and instrumentalists, professionals and interested amateurs *all* should know about the art of *actio*, or gesture and delivery: and we have seen that a personal, emotional delivery was considered, not tasteless and egotistical, but a very good thing in the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

In closing, let me remind you all that the inner experience of the performer is eloquently described by Denis Diderot (1713–1784), in his *Mémoires sur différens sujets de mathématiques* of 1748. This work contains a passage explaining the failure faced by the French inventor Louis-Léon Pajot, Comte d'Ons-en-Bray, who tried to convince musicians that his newly-invented ticking metronome would be useful to them. Diderot tells us that the musicians were not convinced, because:

"They object to all chronometers generally, that there are not perhaps four bars in an air that have the same duration; two things necessarily contribute to slow some down, and to precipitate others: ornamentation [le goût] and harmony in pieces in several parts, and ornamentation and the implied harmony in a *solo*. A musician who knows his art will not have played four bars of an air before he seizes its character and abandons himself to it. It is the pure pleasure of the harmony that causes him to pause; here he wants the chords to be struck, there he wants them to be veiled. This is to say that he sings or plays faster or slower from one measure to another, and even from one beat, and from one quarter beat to the next."<sup>17</sup>



How different is this experience from that of many an early musician today! Diderot does not prescribe first reading the composer's biography in the *New Grove*; and the composer and his intentions are, in fact, entirely absent from Diderot's description. Nor does Diderot suggest making a preparatory comparison of all known manuscript sources, or even embarking on harmonic analysis. The performer simply starts playing and *intuitively* seizes on the character of the piece in the course of his performance. Once he has grasped the air's essence, he does not then engage all his analytical faculties to come to an objective understanding of the composer's intentions, but rather abandons himself entirely to the subjective pleasure of music-making, creating constant changes to the basic tempo based entirely on his own enjoyment. Let us not forget, Diderot makes clear that he is not speaking of a vain, egotistical performer, or of an aberrant exception to the rule, but rather of a musician 'who knows his art'.

Now, gentle listener, before you throw up your arms in exasperation, I will admit that indeed hundreds of years separate us from Diderot's *knowledgeable performer*. I am aware that we cannot claim to have the intimate knowledge that he had of how the music 'was supposed to sound', and that we are no longer able, as he was, *subjectively* to access the emotions of the *past*. If you argue that the emotions we have today are, well, the emotions of today, I will completely agree with you. But, my friends, what other emotions do we have? What else do we have to work with? Now, I do *not* advocate performances of Baroque music guided *solely* by inner feeling, without first educating, developing and disciplining that feeling: if I did, I would not teach at a conservatory, nor would I discipline my own performances by means of musical sources from the past. But I here submit that to exclude the 'me' from a musical rendition is incompatible with a truly Historically Informed Performance. Of course, I can reach, and indeed have reached, musical compromise: I have toned down the 'me' from time to time, to make it better fit the ideals of *today*. But really, to exclude the personal expression of a musician simply because that 'me' is unfashionably emotional is to impose a character test on performers of Early Music based solely on the criteria of today's prevailing taste. It allows only those with more dispassionate temperaments access to the stage. And in doing so, oh remember, as William Blake (1757–1827) so rightly said, that "One Law for the Lion & Ox is Oppression".<sup>18</sup>



## Notes

- 1 The author wishes to clarify that he is a materialist, and does not believe in a soul. The use of the word here is no more than a poetic conjuring of the body's self-awareness.
- 2 Attempts have been made, see for instance Roland S. Persson: *The subjectivity of musical performance: An exploratory music-psychological real world enquiry into the determinants and education of musical reality*, doctoral thesis, University of Huddersfield 1993, <<https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:278485/FULLTEXT01.pdf>> (last accessed 2022-07-10).
- 3 "Ein Verfasser verliebter Sätze muß seine eigene Erfahrung, sie sey gegenwärtig oder verflossen, allerdings hiebey zu Rathe ziehen, so wird er an sich, und an seinem Affect selber, das beste Muster antreffen, darnach er seine Ausdrücken in den Klängen einrichten könne. Hat er aber von sothaner edlen Leidenschaft keine persönliche Empfindung, oder kein rechtes lebhaftes Gefühl, so gebe er sich ja nicht damit ab: denn es wird ihm eher in allen andern Dingen glücken, als in dieser gar zu zärtlichen Neigung. [...] Nächst der Liebe muß einer, der die Traurigkeit im Klange wol vorstellen will, selbige vielmehr, als die übrigen Leidenschaften, fühlen und empfinden; sonst werden alle so genannte *loci topici* (örtliche Stellen der Rede-Kunst) in den Brunnen fallen. Die Ursache ist, daß traurig seyn und verliebt seyn zwey gantz nahe mit einander verwandte Dinge † sind." – "†) Qui dit amoureux, dit triste. *Bussy Rabut. Memoir.*" Johann Mattheson: *Der vollkommene Capellmeister*, Hamburg 1739, pp. 16–17.
- 4 "Zwar müssen auch die andern Gemüths-Bewegungen, wenn sie natürlich vorgestellet werden sollen, grössesten Theils von dem Verfasser nachdrücklich empfunden werden [...]." Ibid., p. 17.
- 5 "[...] es mit den Affecten insonderheit eben die Bewandniß hat, als mit einem unergründlichen Meer, so daß, wie viel Mühe man sich auch nehmen mögte, etwas vollständiges hierüber auszufertigen, doch nur das wenigste zu Buche gebracht, unendlich viel aber ungesagt bleiben, und der eignen natürlichen Empfindung eines ieden anheimgestellt werden dürfte." Ibid., p. 19.
- 6 See Jed Wentz: *H. R. and the formations of an Early Music aesthetic in the Netherlands (1916–1921)*, Forschungsportal Schola Cantorum Basiliensis 2016, <<https://forschung.schola-cantorum-basiliensis.ch/de/forschung/ina-lohr-project/rutters-and-the-early-music-aesthetic.html>> (last accessed 2022-07-06). See also Anne Smith / Jed Wentz: *Gustav Maria Leonhardt in Basel: Portrait of a young harpsichordist*, in: *Basler Jahrbuch für historische Musikpraxis* 34 (2010), pp. 229–244; Jed Wentz: *Gustav Leonhardt, the Naarden circle and Early Music's reformation*, in: *Early Music* 42 (2014), pp. 3–12; idem: *On the Protestant roots of Gustav Leonhardt's playing style*, in: *Bach. The Journal of the Riemenschneider Bach Institute* 48/49 (2018/2019), pp. 48–92.
- 7 For the relationship between the *Singbewegung* and Early Music see Anne Smith: *The development of the 'Jugendmusikbewegung', its musical aesthetic and its influence on the performance practice of Early Music*, in: *Groß Geigen um 1500 / Orazio Michi und die Harfe um 1600*, ed. Martina Papiro, Basel 2020 (*Basler Beiträge zur Historischen Musikpraxis* 39), pp. 465–508.
- 8 Cited in: Jed Wentz: *Gustav Leonhardt, the Naarden circle and Early Music's reformation* (see note 6), p. 7.
- 9 "Als je musicus ben, ben[t] je niet diegene die zijn ego moet tentoonspreiden met behulp van wat, die mooie stukken al die componisten geschreven hebben in het verleden. Dat kun je doen als je dat echt wil maar dan ben je een *ijdelruit*, vind ik. Het kan heel talentvol zijn, maar dat is toch een houding die ik niet leuk vind. Bijvoorbeeld, ik vind, je gaat niet Bach en Mozart gebruiken om je eigen talent te laten schitteren. Speel dan liever Kreisler en die dingen die daar meer voor gemaakt zijn, dat is dan leuk. Maar met de hele fantastische, diepzinnige en soms heel eenvoudige genieën zoals Mozart of Bach toch kunnen zijn, dan moet je vind ik met schroom mee omgaan, zie je, je staat in dienste vind ik, wat niet wil zeggen dat je niet creatief moet zijn, maar je moet vooral proberen uit te maken wat deze mensen hebben gedaan, waar hebben ze het vandaan gehad, wat hebben ze willen zeggen met wat ze daar schreven. En daar moet je geen jota aan toevoegen, en moet daar niet te veel aan zitten prutsen, want je gaat dat effe interessant maken en zo, of 'interpreteren', ik bedoel, ik heb al sinds een aantal jaren echt de onhebbelijkheid om te zeggen dat ik het woord interpretatie niet meer wil hebben, en dat ik veel liever praat over realisatie. We moeten de partituren realiseren, en dat is niet objectief, maar wel het

- zijn *die* partituren, het zijn geen andere dingen. Het zijn wel wij die dat doen het gevaar dat je te objectief doet bestaat nauwelijks.” See *Early Music Icons: Barthold, Sigiswald & Wieland Kuijken*, MusicFrame films, 2014, 24’14”–25’44”. See also Barthold Kuijken: *The notation is not the music: Reflections on Early Music practice and performance*, Bloomington/Indianapolis 2013, p. 2: “The composition is then often used as a pretext for displaying the performers’ own ideas, emotions, and virtuosity. Regrettably, this also sometimes happens under the commercially successful label of ‘authentic Early Music on Historical Instruments.’ The (mostly) non-specialist audience is generally not able to detect the degree of conscious or unconscious manipulation involved, and sure enough, the performance can be very captivating.”
- 10 The exact quotation was “You make a very nice sauce, and then you pour it over everything.” It was not said unkindly, but it was meant as criticism. The immediate instigation came from my use of rubato, but because the freedom I took mimicked the ebb and flow of my emotion in the act of playing, Bart’s dart ultimately struck far deeper than merely the question of playing in time.
  - 11 Between the delivery of this talk and its publication my musical career ended and I have ceased to be a performing musician. How odd for my older self to hear a younger self speak!
  - 12 “Man betrachte die Frantzösischen Sänger und Sängerinnen, mit welcher Inbrunst sie ihre Sachen vorbringen, und fast allemahl dasjenige wirklich bey sich zu empfinden scheinen, wovon sie singen. Daher kömmt es auch, daß sie die Leidenschaften der Zuhörer, zumahl ihrer Landsleute, sehr rege machen, und durch ihre Geberden und Manieren ersetzen, was ihnen sonst an gründlichem Unterricht, an Festigkeit, oder an der Stimme abgethet.” Mattheson: *Der vollkommene Capellmeister* (see note 3), p. 36.
  - 13 Simon Goldhill: *How to stage Greek tragedy today*, Chicago/London 2007, p. 87.
  - 14 [Charles Gildon]: *The life of Mr. Thomas Betterton [...]*, London 1710, p. 68–69.
  - 15 *Ibid.*, p. 71.
  - 16 “Dieses Orts werden wir inzwischen nur so viel davon in die Rechnung bringen, als zu unserm vorgesetzten Zweck dienlich ist: Denn, wer eben kein Redner, kein Schauspieler, kein Tändler von Profession werden will, darff zwar dergleichen Lehren nicht als ein Hauptwerk ansehen; doch wird niemand widersprechen können, daß nicht, wenn man es reifflich erweget, ein grosses Stück der Music, die ja eine Klang-Rede ist, darin stecke, und daß, wer nur immer den Nahmen eines wahren Ton-Meisters behaupten will, wo nicht mehr, wenigstens überhaupt einen deutlichen Begriff davon haben müsse; er mag als ein Liebhaber, um wol zu urtheilen, oder als ein Künstler, um wol zu spielen, zu singen und zu setzen, angesehen werden wollen.” Mattheson: *Der vollkommene Capellmeister* (see note 3), p. 34.
  - 17 “Ils objecteront contre tout Chronomètre en général, qu’il n’y a peut-être dans un air quatre mesures qui soient exactement de la même durée; deux choses contribuant nécessairement à ralentir les unes & à précipiter les autres, le goût & l’harmonie dans les pieces à plusieurs parties; le goût & le pressentiment de l’harmonie dans les *solo*. Un Musicien qui sçait son art, n’a pas joué quatre mesures d’un air qu’il en saisit le caractere & qu’il s’y abandonne: il n’y a que le plaisir de l’harmonie qui le suspende; il veut ici que les accords soient frappés, là qu’ils soient dérobés; c’est-à-dire, qu’il chante ou jouë plus ou moins lentement d’une mesure à un autre & même d’un tems & d’un quart de tems à celui qui le suit.” Denis Diderot: *Mémoires sur différens sujets de mathématiques*, Paris 1748, pp. 193–194.
  - 18 William Blake: *The marriage of heaven and hell*, plate 24. See *Blake’s poetry and designs: Authoritative texts, illuminations in color and monochrome, related prose, criticism*, ed. Mary Lynn Johnson / John E. Grant, New York / London 1979, p. 101.